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ceptualism, these cases were unable to conclude that the subject mat-
ter of litigation could encompass more -than the issues to be litigated
at trial. The better view, represented by Vollmer v. Szabo, is to per-
mit discovery, thereby introducing ,the insurance fund at the settle-
ment stage.
E. JOEL WESP
LABOR RELATIONS - UNION RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
APPLICABILITY OF TITLE VII, 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
Dobbins v. Local 212, IBEW, 292 F. Supp. 413
(S.D. Ohio 1968).
Today the national spirit lies splintered, the victim of a vicious
racial whiplash generated by the unrequited desire of generations
of Negroes and other minority groups for equality of treatment.
Time has run out; national survival depends upon our ability to
make equality a reality today, not tomorrow. Without unobstructed
access to jobs, the "unequal" citizen can make little headway to-
ward becoming securely enmeshed in the fabric of our materialistic
society. The Supreme Court sought to provide the requisite job ac-
cess 25 years ago when it held, in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville
Railroad,1 that a labor union clothed with great power by the Rail-
way Labor Act2 was bound by that Act's provisions and the Con-
stitution's equal protection clause to represent all workers regardless
of race or creed. Based upon that decision and its progeny, the
federal and state courts have been capable of combating discrimina-
tion, and yet because of public indifference, union power and re-
calcitrance, the high cost of judicial relief, and the lack of sophis-
tication of many discrimination victims, the case law had contributed
little to the improvement of the Negroes' position at the time Con-
gress enacted the 1964 Civil Rights Act. 3
-323 U.S. 192 (1944).
245 U.S.C. § 151 (1964).
31d. §§ 2000a to h-6 (1964). This note is exclusively concerned with Title VII
of that Act, id. §§ 2000e to e-15 (1964) [hereinafter cited as the 1964 Act]. It is
important to note that this title is not the sole piece of federal legislation under which
federal agencies can fight employment discrimination. An excellent critical compari-
son of the relief obtainable under the commission established under Title VII, the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), and the remaining agencies,
the National Labor Relations Board and the Office of Federal Contract Compliance
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Civil rights groups hailed the 1964 Act as the long-awaited ve-
hicle by which the common man, now backed by that mentor of
mentors, the Federal Government, could force the economic levia-
than, organized labor, to abandon its discriminatory ways. In the
permissive judicial atmosphere provided by the Warren Court,'
much case law has been generated under both the 1964 Act and the
long-dormant Reconstruction Legislation.' The recent case of Dob-
bins v. Local 212, IBEW,6 presents an occasion to pause and evalu-
ate the effectiveness of the aforementioned legislation amid the con-
fines of a most hostile environment, the building trades, wherein
discrimination (in the more general sense of a total limitation of
employment opportunity) has become, in the union view, the sine
qua non of membership economic survival.
Anderson L. Dobbins was a black independent electrical con-
tractor and experienced nonunion journeyman electrician. After
the failure of his several attempts to secure employment with a
union contractor through the exclusive channel thereto," the refer-
ral system of Local 212 (a job allocation mechanism explained at
length below), Dobbins 'brought a class action against the local "
can be found in Jenkins, Study of Federal Effort to End Job Bias: A History, A Status
Report, and A Prognosis, 14 How. L.J. 259 (1968).
4 See Cox, The Supreme Court 1965 Term, Forward: Constitutional Adjudica-
tion and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARv. L REv. 91 (1966).
5 Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-82 (1964) [hereinafter cited as the
1866 Act].
6292 F. Supp. 413 (S.D. Ohio 1968). The defendant union is Local 212 of the
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers AFL-CIO of Cincinnati, Ohio [here-
inafter referred to as the local].
7 See FORTUNE, Dec. 1968, at 102.
8 Dobbins had applied for union membership at various times prior to the effec-
tive compliance date of the 1964 Act, July 2, 1965. Although he had made one at-
tempt since that time, his NAACP counsel decided not to rest the entire case upon
this single occurrence. The decision to broaden the factual base of Dobbins' case and
the desire of counsel to invoke a constitutional condemnation of the local's conduct
necessitated the inclusion of a claim under the 1866 Act. See Trial Memorandum of
Plaintiff at 35, Dobbins v. Local 212, IBEW, 292 F. Supp. 413 (S.D. Ohio 1968).
The court, however, based its entire decision upon Title VII after noting that the 1866
Act could serve as grounds for relief. 292 F. Supp. at 442. The minor role of the
1866 Act resulted from the court's holding first that Dobbins' relief could be granted
under Title VII because of the single act of discrimination alleged to have taken place
after July 2, 1965, and secondly, that to prove the intent to discriminate required by 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1964), evidence of pre-Act events was admissible. 292 F. Supp.
at 443. For further discussion of the latter point, see text accompanying note 24 infra.
9 In disallowing the class action, the court noted that Dobbins had not established
that there was more than one person in the class and therefore he had failed to meet the
requirements of rule 23(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
10 There were two defendants in the case, the local and the Joint Apprentice Train-
ing Council (JATC). The JATC is a voluntary unincorporated association composed
of six members - three from the union and three from the National Electric Con-
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in which he alleged discrimination in violation of both the 1964
Act"- and the 1866 Act. About 1 month later the United States
filed an action'" against the local in which discrimination against 12
other Negroes was alleged.'" The actions were consolidated and
advanced on the docket in accordance with the terms of the 1964
Act.14
The main thrust of the complaint was that the local, possessed of
nearly absolute power to control employment opportunity, had
used that power to eliminate Negro employment opportunity in
violation of both the 1964 and 1866 Acts.' 5 The evolution of dis-
tractors Association. It conducted a 4-year program composed of biweekly evening
classroom work and fifty 40-hour work weeks with apprentices being paid various
percentages of the union minimum wage. In 1963, the JATC, in anticipation of De-
partment of Labor action under 29 U.S.C. § 50 (1964), adopted formal standards for
apprentice training which met with the approval of the Labor Department's Bureau of
Apprenticeship Training (and this court). The court found that although the JATC
had engaged in various acts of discrimination prior to 1968, in that year it had em-
barked upon an affirmative action program (see note 39 infra & accompanying text)
designed to eradicate the gap between the employability of under priviledged Negro
children and that of white youths. The sole remaining discriminatory practice was
that the JATC continued to alter - in a manner favoring whites - the ratings that
its expert evaluators assigned to applicants. Because of the relatively insignificant dis-
criminatory role played by the JATC at the time the Dobbins case was initiated, it will
not be dealt with further in this article.
11 It is important to note that an individual must exhaust the Title VII administra-
tive procedures prior to seeking relief in the federal courts. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5
(1964). Title VII established the EEOC to "police" cases arising under the Act. Id.
§ 2 000e-4 . The original conception was to create a commission patterned after the
NLRB, empowered to issue cease and desist decrees which would be conclusive as to
findings of fact upon judicial review. However, political necessity dictated that certain
changes be made; those changes (known as the Mansfield-Dirksen amendments) signifi-
cantly reduced the Commission's effectiveness. For present purposes, it is sufficient to
note that the Commission's role is solely that of a conciliator divested of any power to
enforce its compliance notices. For a comprehensive discussion of the Commission, see
M. SOVERN, LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON RACIAL DIscIMINATIoN IN EMPLOYMENT 61-
102 (1966).
12 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a) (1964) empowers the Attorney General of the United
States to bring an action whenever he "has reasonable cause to believe that any person
or group of persons is engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance to the full enjoy-
ment of any of the rights secured by this subchapter."
13 The alleged acts of discrimination are discussed in the text accompanying notes
18-23 infra.
14 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(b) (1964). For the purpose of this discussion, the action
will be treated as if there were but one plaintiff and one defendant: Important rami-
fications of the more complex realities of party alignment will be dealt with as clarity
requires.
15 Without comment, the court assumed that Congress, by the 1964 Act, intended
and was constitutionally able to reach ostensibly private (union) acts of discrimination.
This passive judicial reaction to the rather lengthy arguments on the point by the fed-
eral attorneys reflects the fact that because of the availability of both the commerce
power rationale which supported earlier cases under Title II of the 1964 Act (see Heart
of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964), and Katzenbach v. Mc-
Clung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964)) and the Supreme Court's recent expansive reading of
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criminatory practices which the allegations brought to light presents
a classic model of effective (union) "one-up-manship." In 1963,
a new Federal Building was under construction in Cincinnati. Civil
rights groups, in an effort to increase Negro craft union member-
ship, chose this occasion to focus their attention upon the member-
ship admission procedures of the various craft locals (which were
predominantely or all white) engaged in that project. In that ini-
tial campaign and in the years that followed, the union parried
each hostile thrust by effecting a devious response composed of
well publicized cooperative (but meaningless) action which was
counterbalanced by covert changes to its unwritten procedures. 6
So successful was the union's strategy, based upon the subtle use of
sham action and discretionary power, that it took 5 years and gov-
ernment intervention to bring the entire picture into focus.
The collective bargaining agreement (CBA) which had evolved
from the aforementioned confrontation allowed the union to oper-
ate an exclusive hiring hall to supply workers to area contractors.
The only exceptions to this exclusivity were "48-hour men." When
the union could not refer a man within 48 hours, the contractor -
with local approval - was permitted to hire any available worker
until referral became possible. No referred worker could be
"bumped" off the job by a worker with a higher priority. The re-
congressional power to proscribe acts beyond the literal language of the 14th amend-
ment in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), a serious challenge to the con-
stitutionality of Title VII is not likely.
The court did find it necessary to justify the use of the 1866 Act to proscribe private
acts of discrimination, and did so by citing the recent case of Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), wherein the Supreme Court used the 1866 Act to sanction a
private party's refusal to convey property. The analogy was well taken because the
portion of the 1866 Act affecting the right to contract for employment (herein at is-
sue) was contained within the same section 1 of the Act as the provisions relied
upon in the Jones case. Section 1 of the Act provides in part: "[A]ll persons born in
the United States . . . shall have the same right, in every State and Territory in the
United States, to make and enforce contracts . . . purchase, lease, sell, hold, and con-
vey real and personal property .... " 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-82 (1964); see Recent Deci-
sion, 20 CAsE W. R1Es. L. REV. 448 (1968). The aforementioned language is ap-
plicable to the contractual relationship of union membership and referral status. Cf.
Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958). In view of the above, it can be safely
assumed that future plaintiffs can, without lengthy justification, rely upon the protec-
tion of both the 1964 and 1866 Acts.
16The intricacy of these maneuvers can best be demonstrated by example. A
competency examination, which the local advertised as a membership examination, was
given in 1966. It was, in fact, an examination to determine whether a person was
qualified to participate in the referral system. Forty-two of the 55 men who took the
examination were veterans of the referral system: Only one of these 55 men was black.
All men failed the test yet the veterans continued to be referred. The entire procedure
was a sham to quiet the demands of civil rights groups for a membership exam. Par-
ticipation in this meaningless exercise was made a prerequisite for taking the 1967
membership examination.
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ferral procedures contained no formal standards for evaluating
whether a worker was a qualified electrician; rather, the union busi-
ness agent used his discretion in making this threshold determina-
tion. The procedures encompassed four formal priority groups with
classification accomplished according to the following criteria:
Group 1 - 4 years' trade experience, area resident, passed journey-
man exam, employed under CBA during 1 of the last 4 years (no
Negro had ever been referred from this category); Group 2 - 4
years' trade experience and passed journeyman examination (one
Negro was referred from -this category in 1968); Group 3 - 2 years'
trade experience, area resident, 6 months' experience under CBA
(this was -the largest referral group and no Negro had ever been
referred therefrom); Group 4- 1 year's trade experience (no Negro
had ever been referred from this group). The local had never had
a Negro member and, at a representative date in 1967, only two out
of 600 nonmember employees of area union contractors were
Negroes. After the 1967 CBA negotiations, only indentured ap-
prentices - anyone learning the trade who was participating in the
Joint Apprenticeship Training Council (JATC) program 17 - were
employable by union contractors. Subsequently there have been
only two routes leading to union membership: (1) work 4 years for
a nonunion contractor, and (2) join the JATC program. However,
because the union had an unwritten rule that membership applica-
tions would not be accepted from electricians working for nonunion
contractors, JATC involvement became, in reality, the sole route to
union membership. Because of its discriminatory procedures in
processing applicants (prior to 1968), the JATC effectively slammed
the door in the Negro's face on the -threshold of his search for em-
ployment. The stricture was complete; the local had prevailed in
the struggle that started in 1963.
Based upon its inspection of the application of the above proce-
dures to individual worker-union interaction, the court concluded
that of the 27 Negroes who had contacted the local subsequent to
the effective date of Title VII, July 2, 1965, 13 (including Dob-
bins) had been discriminated against by one or more of the follow-
ing local practices: 18 (1) failure to inform Negro applicants of
1 7 See note 10 supra.
18 The court based its conclusions upon 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1964), rather than
upon EEOC rulings or other case law. It is interesting to note the dearth of court
citation to EEOC rulings. This situation seems to be the logical result of the damag-
ing blow to the EEOC's potency dealt by the Mansfield-Dirksen amendments alluded
to in note 12 supra. For relevant subsections of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1964), see note
24 infra.
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the existence of the referral system (prior to August 1967); (2)
incomplete disclosure of application procedures" and examination
prerequisites; 20 (3) failure to group and refer qualified men; (4)
failure to administer a membership examination from 1965 to
1967;21- (5) the chilling22 and arbitrary nature of the prerequisites23
established for the 1967 membership examination.
In formulating the above findings, the court was careful to de-
lineate the chronological limitations which the invoked legislation
placed upon the admissibility of discriminatory evidence in each
case. The determination as to whether a particular worker-plaintiff
qualified for equitable relief and whether the referral system con-
stituted a discriminatory procedure was governed by this consider-
ation. Taking the government case first, it was noted earlier that
the 1964 Act upon which that action was based had an effective
date of July 2, 1965. Any action taken (or procedure continued)
on or after that date, the intent of which was to discriminate within
the meaning of Title VII, creates a cause of action under the Act.
19 The union had an unwritten rule that no application for membership would be
accepted from a worker not then employed under the local's collective bargaining agree-
ment. However, applications made by Negroes were readily accepted without com-
ment. 292 F. Supp. at 423.
20 One interesting facet of the local's examination procedure was that one exam-
ination, which was held exclusively for Negro applicants in mid-1963, was scheduled
for a nonexistent day, Monday, July 9, 1963; Monday fell on July 8, 1963. Id. at 425.
2 1 Local membership policy is governed by the International's Constitution, local
by-laws, and the negotiated collective bargaining agreements. The most demanding of
these documents requires that the local membership board meet monthly to examine
applicants. Id. at 419.
2 2 The court analogized to Dombroski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965), wherein
the Supreme Court held the Louisiana Subversive Activities and Communist Control
Act to be unconstitutional because of its vagueness. The "chilling effect" upon the
first amendment's freedom of expression guarantee, which can result from a state's
criminal prosecution, was held to justify plaintiff's refusal to exhaust his state court
remedies. The Dobbins court has pulled the word "chilling" out of the aforementioned
dual context - first amendment and exhaustion - and in so doing has entered un-
charted waters. Dobbins alone invoked the Constitution in his trial presentation.
See Trial Memorandum for Plaintiff, supra note 8, at 35. He alleged fifth amend-
ment violations which were not concerned with exhaustion of remedies. The attempt
to extend Dombroski beyond the specially treated first amendment area is interesting
but not convincing, considering the Supreme Court's favored treatment of that amend-
ment. See Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 618-19 (1968). See also Recent Deci-
sion, 19 CASE W. ES. L. REV. 1089 (1968).
23 See note 16 supra.
24 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) to (d) (1964) makes it an unlawful employment practice:
[(c) ) (1) to exclude.., from ... membership, or otherwise to discrimi-
nate against, any individual because of his race, color... [or] (2) to limit...
its membership, or to classify or fail or refuse to refer for employment any in-
dividual because of such individual's race, color . . . [or] (d) it shall be an
unlawful employment practice for any . . . labor organization, or joint labor-
management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training . . . to
1969]
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While certain actions by their very nature expose their perpetra-
.tors' intent, others are ostensibly neutral. To pierce the latter cate-
gory's shell of neutrality, the court felt it necessary to consider pre-
Act events which were indicative of the purpose of a particular pro-
cedure. Thus, in addition to direct discriminatory acts perpetrated
since July 2, 1965, discriminatory treatment resulting from contact
with procedures continued after that date (such as the referral sys-
tem) which, while ostensibly neutral, perpetuated the anti-Negro
intent of an earlier period, constituted a basis for redress under Title
VII.
The same pre/post Act distinction was not applicable in the
Dobbins case because the 1866 Act does not make intent to dis-
criminate an element in the act of discrimination.' However,
the evidence in that action (insofar as it rested upon the 1866 Act)
was governed by the applicable state statute of limitations and the
court held that September 1963 represented the chronological line
of demarcation.26  Mr. Dobbins' case was thus stronger than that
of the government, both because earlier direct acts could be adduced
and because no intent to discriminate needed to be demonstrated.
The above accounts for Dobbins' counsel's inclusion of allegations
under both the 1964 Act and 1866 Act.
In addition to the chronological limitations noted above, the
court found it necessary to delineate certain acts which were not
within the purview of the term discriminatory. Specifically, it re-
fused to accept three of the government's allegations of discrimin-
ation: First, it rejected the contention that a prima facie case of dis-
crimination is established when it is proved that a local or its ap-
prenticeship program is predominantly or all white. The craft na-
ture of the local dictated the court's position that, absent a showing
that a significant number of Negroes possessed the requisite skills
or qualifications for a craft, the racial balance within a group is not
probative.28 In Dobbins, the evidence demonstrated that, in fact,
discriminate against any individual because of his race, [or] color . . . in any
program established to provide apprenticeship or other training.
25 See note 15 supra.
26 The court chose the forum state's tort statute of limitations, 4 years, because no
federal law spoke to the issue. OHIO REV. CODE § 2305.09 (Page Supp. 1968). This
seems inconsistent with the court's opinion that the entire Dobbins case was con-
tractual in nature. 292 F. Supp. at 442. The Ohio contract statute of limitations is 6
years on an oral contract (the case here). OHIO REV. CODE § 2305.07 (Page Supp.
1968).
27 See comments on the effects of the Mansfield-Dirksen amendments to Title
VII, note 11 supra.
28 The court used a negative inference from the holding of the Supreme Court in
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very few qualified Negroes existed in the Cincinnati area. Secondly,
the fact that only contractors who employed white electricians ex-
clusively were subjected to local organizing efforts was held not to
create a prima facie case of discrimination.29 The court felt that
because only one nonunion contractor had been approached by the
local since the effective date of the Act, that isolated incident did
not establish a pattern of discrimination. The legislative history of
Title VII supports the court's holding. ° Thirdly, because intent to
discriminate must be demonstrated,"- absolute limitations as to mem-
bership in either a union or its apprenticeship program3" are not
violative of Title VII.33  That title is concerned only with the
manner in which the aggregate of membership is determined, not
the aggregate itself.
The most serious problem in the implementation of civil rights
legislation has always been - and still is - the formulation of an
effective decree within the parameters of the particular statutes in-
volved.3 4 The judicial challenge is that of creating controls
whereby the recalcitrant can be forced to abide by both the letter
and spirit of -the law. As the Cincinnati experience demonstrates,
because discrimination is best accomplished through the use of
flexible, unwritten policy to guide discretionary decisions, the de-
cree, a mere proclamation frozen in time, represents an inept shep-
herd.
The Dobbins court approached the problem by considering the
nature and amount of corrective action which ought to be required
of the local, the proper relief for the individual worker-plaintiffs,
and the fate of the referral system. The court held tfhat direct
remedial action could and would be required of the local to correct
the results of discrimination. The government had prayed that af-
Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935), in which the Court based its ruling that Ne-
groes were improperly excluded from jury service upon the fact that, while qualified
Negro candidates were available in large numbers, no Negro had ever served upon a
jury. 292 F. Supp. at 446.
239 Id. at 445.
30 Id. at 444.
3142 U.S.C. § 20ooe-5(g) (1964). This was one of the facets of the Mansfield-
Dirksen amendments mentioned in note 11 supra.
32 These limitations serve the craft unions in the same manner as seniority serves
the factory oriented unions; they protect against layoffs. For an excellent and concise
treatment of discrimination and seniority, see Note, Title VII, Seniority Discrimination,
and the Incumbent Negro, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1260 (1967).
3 3 NLRB v. Shipbuilding Workers, 391 U.S. 418 (1968).
3 4 See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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firmative action in the broad sense 5 of requiring the local to as-
sist, through special remedial training programs, those Negroes who
had been denied apprenticeship training and referral in the post-
1964 Act period. The court would not accept the government's ex-
pansive interpretation of its remedial authority 6 and instead decreed
that qualified workers who had been the victims of post-Act dis-
crimination were to be grouped and referred immediately with credit
for work under a collective bargaining agreement from the date of
the discrinzinatory act after the Act's effective date. 7 This formula-
tion has been the historical limit 8 to relief from discrimination, and
the Dobbins court suggests it is the limit under Title VII. 9
The referral system presented the most complex aspect of the
decree. As noted earlier, the evidence clearly demonstrated that
35 See Black, The Supreme Court 1966 Term, Poreward: "State Action", Equal
Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REv. 69 (1967); Cox, supra
note 4, at 93.
36 292 F. Supp. at 445.
37 Id. at 450.
38 It should be noted that the Supreme Court's recent decisions may represent the
ground work upon which state and federal legislative power can be utilized to force
the private sector to carry its part of the total affirmative burden in the struggle to
equalize opportunity. See Cox, supra note 4, at 114-20.
39 The court interpreted Title VII's position as to the meaning of "affirmative'*
action. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1964), states in part: "If the court finds that the re-
spondent has intentionally engaged . . . in an unlawful employment practice . . . [it)
may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and
order such affirmative action as may be appropriate .. " The enumerated remedies
which follow in subsection (g) are two: reinstatement and award of interim earnings.
This limitation of "affirmative" action is complemented by id. § 2000e-2(j) (1964)
(emphasis added), which states in part: "Nothing contained in this subchapter shall
be interpreted to require any ... labor organization ... to grant preferential treatment
to any individual or group because of Lace, color...." This narrow interpretation of
affirmative contained in the statutory language finds support in the 1964 Act's legisla-
tive history. 292 F. Supp. 413, 444 (1968).
The court, however, departed from the aforementioned finality of Title VII and
sailed into uncharted waters when, in dicta, it later distinguished between the limits
of relief from continuing pre-Act patterns as opposed to post-Act discriminatory actions.
In the latter situations the court seemed to be shaping the standard of required action
with the broad stroke of Professor Black when it stated:
Relief requiring affirmative remedial action in order to correct the effects of
a post-Act pattern and practice is necessary and proper. Where a labor union
has engaged in a pattern or practice, the form and substance of the relief must
be designed to effectuate the declared Congressional policy of open employ-
ment opportunities.... Id. at 447.
Was the court discarding its earlier position that broadly affirmative acts - such as
classes to qualify the underprivileged for apprenticeship training - were forbidden
by Title VII? The more limited requirements of the decree answer in the negative,
yet confusion and distortion can result when courts speak broadly of "affirmative" ac-
tion. For another interpretation of the broad type of affirmative relief that may be
granted, see Asbestos Workers v. Vogler, 37 U.S.L.W. 2447 (5th Cit. Jan. 15, 1969),
wherein the court affirmed a preliminary injunction ordering that one out of every two
union job referrals be given to a Negro.
UNION RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
the referral system, as currently structured, was intended to deny
employment to Negroes and, in fact, did so operate. It was not per
se discriminatory, but the evidence revealed that it was discriminatory
in fact. The court noted that Title VII empowered it to completely
eradicate the referral system. Although both Title VII and the
National Labor Relations Act 0 recognized the validity of seniority
provisions and the latter legislation sanctions exclusive hiring hallsin the building trades, 41 neither Act ought to be permitted to shelter
a procedure which perpetuates past discriminatory policy.42 This
was the -holding of the district court in the recent case of Quarles v.
Philip AMorris,43 and the Dobbins court, while accepting the logic of
that decision, held that where no large group of competent Negroes
(beyond the 27 who were the subject of the Dobbins case) was com-
peting in the relevant labor market, the drastic step of eradicating the
entire referral system need not be taken. The court seemed to reflect
both that traditional judicial hesitancy which militates against taking
a "giant step" in developing areas of the law and to feel that the
time-tested referral procedure had inherent merit worth preserving.
However, the better view seems to be that similar referral proce-
dures, which now exist throughout the building trades unions, rep-
resent a generally restrictive device whose purpose is to keep the
supply of journeymen low and wages high in the face of an un-
precedented present and projected demand for new structures of all
types. 44 While it is clear that the shaping of judicial relief in racial
discrimination cases brought under either Title VII or the 1866 Act
cannot eliminate the economic illogic which the referral-hiring hall
system represents, certainly these decrees ought not to preserve such
systems in the name of efficiency.
Economic considerations aside, it was clear that some locally ad-
ministered plan was required to prevent chaos from characterizing
4042 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1964), and 29 U.S.C. § 158(f)(4) (1964).
4129 U.S.C. § 158(0(3) (1964).
42 It should be noted that seniority fulfills a different function for a craft union
than that which it fulfills in industrial unions. In the latter area, seniority prevents
unemployment by setting up "bump-back" or last-in-first-out procedures to insure that
workers with longevity will face minimal unemployment. In craft unions seniority
gives one a better chance to regain employment by entitling the senior men to superior
group classification and the resultant speedier referral. Thus, in a craft union, se-
niority may be viewed as less of a vested right than in the factory union; the "preven-
tion" function, however, is accomplished through the hiring hall referral system's gen-
eral restrictions of entry opportunity alluded to in the text accompanying note 29
supra.
43 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
44 See FORTuNE, Dec. 1968, at 102.
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the craft union hiring process. The challenge was to prevent that
plan from incorporating the discrimination of the past during the
transitional period. The Dobbins court held that a temporary re-
ferral system was to be created which did not involve grouping
based upon union membership, prior passing of union examina-
tions, or period of employment by a union contractor. (Presumably
the existing system - less the directly discriminatory procedures
noted above - may be reestablished after time has removed its
discriminatory taint.)
While the retention of the present hiring hall referral form is,
in this writer's view, a less than ideal economic solution to the
Cincinnati type situation, the nimple restructuring of grouping cri-
teria to match the form of the decree will not suffice to accom-
plish even the more limited purpose of preventing future facial dis-
crimination.45  Reliability insurance in the form of lengthy re-
tention of jurisdiction over the parties is of critical importance be-
cause the ease of devising new grouping criteria is paralleled by the
facility with which those new criteria may be perverted. The time
frame forces the court to assume the posture of a supervisory ad-
ministrative body rather than the traditional stance of an arbiter of
disputes.
The courts can and will do their part, as in Dobbins, by forcing
initial compliance and retaining jurisdiction over the defendants
to insure that the initial corrective action is taken. But this appears
to be the limit of their reach. Each local is the master of its own
vessel and the fleet numbers in the thousands. It would be sheer
folly to presume that we may expect substantially greater mileage
than that extracted from the Steele case46 from Dobbins, or any
other similar action. They are restricted ,to -their facts by the tradi-
tional recalcitrance and discriminatory practices of building trade
unions.47  Indigents and the United States Attorney General can-
not force the multitude of locals into line by court action alone.
But this is not to say that the Title VII cases are without signifi-
cance.
Steele stood alone in a hostile atmosphere of discrimination. As
4 5 This writer suggests that a most workable referral procedure would be one struc-
tured along present lines but endowed with a set of group classification criteria which
comport with the intent and form of the decree. Those group criteria might include
work experience in the trade without regard to past union affiliation, the demonstration
of various levels of competence to the JATC, not the union, and area residency.
46 See text accompanying note 7 supra.
4 7 See M. SOVERN, supra note 11, at 200.
